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We analyse a two period model of the interbank market, i.e. the market
at which banks trade liquidity. We assume that banks do not take the inter-
bank interest rate as given, but multilaterally negotiate on interest rates and
transaction volumes. The solution concept applied is the Shapley value. We
show that there is a multiplicity of average equilibrium interest rates of the
￿rst period so that the average interest rate in this period does not convey
any information on the expected liquidity situation at the interbank market.Zusammenfassung
Wir analysieren ein Zwei-Perioden-Modell des Interbankenmarktes, d. h.
des Marktes an dem Banken untereinander Liquidit￿t handeln. Wir nehmen
an, dass die Banken den Zinssatz am Interbankenmarkt nicht als exogen be-
trachten, sondern Zinss￿tze und Transaktionsvolumen in multilateralen Ver-
handlungen festlegen. Als Gleichgewichtskonzept dient der Shapley-Wert.
Wir zeigen, dass der durchschnittliche Zinssatz der ersten Periode im Gle-
ichgewicht nicht eindeutig ist und daher keine Informationen ￿ber die er-
wartete Liquidit￿tssituation am Interbankenmarkt enth￿lt.Table of contents
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in a dynamic interbank market game 1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Central banks normally use the average overnight interbank market rate (the
EONIA rate in the European monetary union, the Fed funds rate in the
US) as an indicator for the liquidity situation at the interbank market. If
the rate is high, the market is assumed to expect a liquidity de￿cit, if the
rate is low, it is assumed to expect a liquidity surplus. This method to
assess the liquidity situation at the interbank market can easily be justi￿ed
theoretically. Ho and Saunders (1985) and Spindt and Hoﬀmeister (1988)
for example discuss models of the Fed funds market, while V￿lim￿ki (2001),
Quir￿s and MendizÆbal (2001) and Tapking (2002) analyse models of the
European interbank market. In all of these models, the equilibrium rate is
the higher the more likely a liquidity de￿cit is. However, most of these models
are general equilibrium models and thus based on the assumption that all
banks take the interbank rate as given.
At least in Europe, transactions at the interbank market are usually
agreed on in direct negotiations between banks, often on the telephone.
Sometimes, brokers are involved to help banks to ￿nd a transaction partner,
but the terms of transactions, i.e. interest rates and transaction volumes, are
still a matter of negotiations between the banks.2 Therefore, one may ques-
tion whether a general equilibrium model with interest rates taking banks
is an appropriate model of the interbank market. Consequently, one may
ask whether the overnight interbank market rate is still a good indicator for
the liquidity situation at the interbank market, if banks do not take interest
rates as given but determine interest rates and transaction volumes in nego-
tiations. The latter question is exactly what we are going to address in this
paper.
Why do we have doubts that the overnight rate is a good indicator of
the liquidity situation at the interbank market if banks determine the terms
1I thank Heinz Herrmann and Joachim Keller for helpful comments. The views ex-
pressed in this paper are my own and do not necessarily re￿ect the view of the Bundesbank
or the view of the European Central Bank.
2A detailed describtion of the European interbank market can be found in Hartmann,
Manna and Manzanares (2001).
1of transactions in negotiations? Consider for example two banks that pro-
visionally agree that the ￿rst will lend a certain amount of liquidity to the
second at a certain interest rate. If the banks now receive new information
that indicate that a liquidity de￿cit is more likely than previously expected,
we might expect the banks to agree to adjust the terms of their transaction.
But what kind of new agreement will they choose? They maybe agree to
leave the transaction volume as it is, but raise the interest rate. However,
it also appears to be possible that they agree to leave the interest rate as
it is, but reduce the transaction volume. In the latter case, changes in the
expectations would not lead to changes in the interest rates.
To put forward this idea in a precise and consistent way, we consider
a model of an interbank market with institutional characteristics similar to
those of the European interbank market.3 We look at only one so called
maintenance period which lasts two days. With the beginning of the ￿rst
day of the maintenance period, each bank starts with an initial endowment
of liquidity (i.e. deposits on accounts with the central bank). With the
beginning of the second day, banks face a random in￿ux or drain of liquidity.
The central bank requires each bank to hold on average a certain amount
of liquidity at each day of the maintenance period on a so called minimum
reserve account with the central bank. On the last day of the maintenance
period, banks can lend liquidity to the central banks deposit facility and
they can borrow liquidity from the central banks marginal lending facility.
The interest rate paid for lending into the deposit facility is called deposit
rate, the rate for borrowing from the marginal lending facility is the marginal
lending rate. Both facility rates are ￿xed by the central bank. The marginal
lending rate is higher than the deposit rate. On both days of the maintenance
period, banks can borrow liquidity from other banks and lend liquidity to
other banks. Thus, each banks that has less liquidity at its disposal at the
beginning of the second day than remaining reserve requirements at that
day must borrow liquidity either from the central bank￿s marginal lending
facility or from other banks at the interbank market. All other banks can
lend liquidity to the central bank￿s deposit facility or to other banks. The
objective of each bank is to maximise the (expected) liquidity it has at its
disposal after the end of the maintenance period.
The crucial assumption in our model is that no bank takes interest rates
3A complete describtion of the ECB￿s regulatory instruments related to the interbank
market is in European Central Bank (2000).
2as given. All banks instead negotiate multilaterally on interest rates and
transaction volumes on both days of the maintenance period. The negotia-
tions are modelled as a cooperative game and the solution concept applied is
the Shapley value. Our model can therefore be described as a dynamic coop-
erative game. At the last day of the maintenance period, negotiations take
place in which the outcome of the negotiations of the ￿rst day are taken as
given. In the negotiations at the ￿rst day, banks take the expected outcome
of the negotiations of the second day into consideration.
It is of special importance that the banks do not directly negotiate on
interest rates and transaction volumes. Instead, they negotiate on how to
share the (maximum expected) joint liquidity of the banking industry after
the end of the maintenance period. I.e. the direct outcome of the negotiations
is a number for each bank (the Shapley value of the bank), which gives the
bank￿s expected ￿nal liquidity. The implicit interest rates and transaction
volumes that are compatible with these numbers can then be derived. Finally,
one can calculate the implicit average interest rate from these implicit interest
rates and transaction volumes.
The main results of our analysis are the following: As soon as the interest
rates and transaction volumes of the ￿rst day of the maintenance period
are given, a unique implicit average interest rate of the second day of the
maintenance period can be derived from the outcome of the negotiations of
the second day. However, there is a multiplicity of implicit average interest
rates of the ￿rst day. The average interest rate at that day can be any number
between 0 and 1, no matter whether the market is expecting a liquidity de￿cit
or a liquidity surplus. The average overnight interest rate at the ￿rst day of
the maintenance period is therefore useless as an indicator of the expected
liquidity situation at the interbank market.
The reason for the multiplicity of average overnight rates is simple: If
for example average rates are ￿xed at a very low level and the transaction
volumes are increasing, borrowing banks are normally getting better oﬀ and
lending banks are getting worse oﬀ. If instead interest rates are rising and
the transaction volumes are constant, borrowing banks are normally getting
worse oﬀ and lending banks are getting better oﬀ. If now both the transaction
volumes and the interest rates are increasing but the interest rates remain at
a relatively low level, the expected pro￿ts of all banks may remain unchanged.
That implies that there are diﬀerent combinations of overnight interest rates
and transaction volumes that all lead to the same expected ￿nal amount of
liquidity for all banks. Since both the overnight rates and the transaction
3volumes are directly determined by the banks and all banks are indiﬀerent
between these combinations, they are all compatible with the assumptions
of our model.
Note that the Shapley value has often been used as a solution concept
for models of exchange economies. The Shapley value has been introduced
and justi￿ed axiomatically by Shapley (1953). A textbook treatment of the
Shapley value can be found for example in Myerson (1991) and Eichberger
(1993). Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) give a noncooperative justi￿cation of
the Shapley value as a bargaining solution concept. First applications of
the Shapley value as an equilibrium concept for exchange economies with
transferable utility are Shapley (1964) and Aumann and Shapley (1974), es-
pecially chapter 6.4 In the wake of these contributions, many articles have
been published which analyse the relation between the general equilibrium
of an exchange economy and the core and Shapley value of the related coop-
erative game, the so called market game.5 See chapter A and B in Mertens
and Sorin (1994) for an overview.
In section 2, we describe our model which is analysed in the sections 3
and4. The last day of the maintenance period is considered in section 3.
Going backwards, we deal with the ￿rst day of the maintenance period in
section 4. In section 5, we try to test empirically a hypothesis that can be
motivated by our theoretical ￿ndings. We show that the empirical results
crucially depend on how expectations are approximated empirically.
2 The model
In this section, we formally describe the main institutional assumptions used
in our model. Our assumptions on how prices and transaction volumes are
determined in multilateral negotiations among banks will be exposed in later
sections. We consider a set I = {1,...,n} of n banks and only one mainte-
nance period lasting for only two days t =1and t =2 . Moreover, we assume
that all borrowing and lending of liquidity has a maturity of only one day.
4A recent discussion of Aumann and Shapley (1974) can be found in Butnariu and
Klement (1996).
5This literature has well established that under quite general conditions the utility
allocation of the general equilibrium is the unique element of the core of the related
market game and coincides with its Shapley value, if no player has signi￿cant market
power (in￿nite and non-atomic player sets).
4Finally, a day in our model will be thought of as a point of time rather than
a period of time.
Let Ai,t ≥ 0 be the reserves that bank i holds on its minimum reserve
account with the central bank from t to t+1(t =1 ,2). We assume that bank
i has to satisfy Ai,1 + Ai,2 ≥ mi,i . e .mi is the bank￿s (exogenous and aggre-
gated, i.e. not average) minimum reserve requirement for the maintenance
period under consideration. The central bank pays no interest on reserves
so that bank i holds not more reserves with the central bank than necessary,
thus
Ai,1 + Ai,2 = mi (1)
On day t =1 ,b a n ki starts with an initial endowment Li of liquidity.




i=1 mi. On both days of the maintenance
period, banks can go to the interbank market to lend liquidity to or borrow
liquidity from other banks. Let F
j
i,t be the liquidity bank j borrows from bank
i from t to t+1and r
j







j,t. The terms of trade between two banks i and




i,t, are a matter of negotiations
as will be explained in the following sections. Thus, neither bank i nor bank
j takes the interest rate r
j
i,t as given.
In t =2 ,b a n ki realizes a random and exogenous liquidity in￿ux gi which
may be positive or negative. The term gi is mainly driven by customers
of bank i paying in or withdrawing money from their account. Moreover, gi
comprises for example liquidity drains because of dividend payments, payouts
of factor income and real investments.
In t =2 , the banks can lend a liquidity surplus to and borrow a liquidity
de￿cit from the central bank￿s standing facilities. The liquidity lent by bank i
to the central bank via the deposit facility is Di, the liquidity borrowed from
the central bank via the marginal lending facility is Si. The deposit rate is rD
and the marginal lending rate is rS (rS >r D). We assume both rates to be
exogenous and non-random. The banks have no access to standing facilities
in t =1 . This assumption is of course not in accordance with the reality at
the European interbank market where banks can go to the ECB￿s standing
facilities on every day. But it can be shown that only under quite extreme
parameter constellations the banks in our model would use the standing
facilities in t =1 , if we additionally assumed that they had access to them
on every day of the maintenance period. The assumption that banks can go
5to the standing facilities only on the last day of the maintenance period is
thus quite harmless and simpli￿es our analysis signi￿cantly.
From the assumptions described so far, we can derive several identity
equations. In t =1 , each bank can use its initial endowment either to ful￿l
reserve requirements or to lend it to other banks at the interbank market.
We therefore have







The liquidity bank i can dispose of in t =2is given by








i,1 + gi (3)
or, from the expenditure side, by







Finally, bank i￿s liquidity after the end of the maintenance period, i.e. at
day t =3 ,i s








i,2 +( 1+rD)Di − (1 + rS)Si (5)
Note that Li,3 is the ￿nal value of bank i￿s activity at the interbank market
in the maintenance period under consid e r a t i o n .T h i si sb e c a u s ew ea s s u m e
that no endogenous liquidity drains occur during the maintenance period,
but the whole liquidity surplus is reinvested according to equations 3 and 4.
Therefore, we assume that bank i￿s objective at day t, t =1 ,2, is to maximise
Et[Li,3], i.e. its in t expected liquidity after the end of the maintenance
period.
In the next two sections, we analyse the banks￿ behaviour at the interbank
market. We consider the interaction between several banks at the interbank
market as a cooperative game. Banks are not price taker, but negotiate
multilaterally with each other on interest rates and amounts of liquidity lent
and borrowed. The main analytical concept used is the Shapley value. To
begin with, we consider the last day of the maintenance period.
63 The last day of the maintenance period
On the last day of the maintenance period t =2 ,e a c hb a n ki has to satisfy
Ai,2 = mi − Ai,1,w h e r eAi,1 is given. Thus, Ai,2 is given and each bank has
to decide only on its recourse to the facilities (Di and Si) and its activities
at the interbank market. The terms of deals at the interbank market are
determined in multilateral negotiations. The payoﬀ some bank i obtains
on the basis of these negotiations in t =2is its Shapley value and will be
denoted by L∗
i,3. To determine the Shapley value for each bank, we ￿rst have
to go through some hypothetical considerations on coalition behaviour.
Let ρ = I2 denote the set of all subsets of I.E a c h k ∈ ρ is called a
possible coalitions of banks. Coalitions are to be thought of as follows: Each
bank can take part in exactly one coalition per day. If some bank i is in
coalition k on day t =2 , it can only borrow from and lend to those banks
on that day which are also in k. Thus, for some coalition k on day t =2we
have F
j
i,2 =0for all i ∈ k,j / ∈ k.D e n o t eb yxi bank i￿s liquidity surplus in
t =2 .I ti sd e ￿ned by
xi = Li,2 − (mi − Ai,1) (6)
Now assume that the members of coalition k would act such that they max-
imise the sum of the payoﬀs of all banks in k, if coalition k were formed in

















i,2 = xi for all i ∈ k
F
j
i,2 =0 for all i ∈ k,j / ∈ k
The solution of the above maximization problem leads to a value for vk,2 that
we denote by v∗
k,2. The function that assigns the value v∗
k,2 to each possible
coalition k ∈ ρ is called the characteristic function. It is needed in order to
determine the Shapley value for a given bank.
Since recourse to both facilities on the same day is never optimal for a




i∈k Di and Si =0for all i ∈ k if
P
i∈k xi ≥ 0 and (2)
P
i∈k xi = −
P
i∈k Si,T
and Di =0for all i ∈ k if
P



















i∈k xi ≥ 0
0,i f
P
i∈k xi < 0
(8)
as the obvious solution of the above problem. Equation 7 gives us the char-
acteristic function of our cooperative game in t =2 .
Since we know the characteristic function now, we can apply common
equilibrium concepts of cooperative game theory like the core or the Shapley
value to our problem. We are going to work with the Shapley value. Let
qk =
(#k − 1)!(n − #k)!
n!
(9)













k\{i},2] can be interpreted as bank i￿s contribution to
coalition k. It is the higher the more the coalition would lose if bank i drops
out of the coalition. If i/ ∈ k,t h e nw eo fc o u r s eh a v e[v∗
k,2 − v∗
k\{i},2]=0 .
The numbers qk are non-negative weights. Let ρi = {k ∈ ρ|i ∈ k}.I t i s
easy to show that
P
k∈ρi qk =1 .B a n k i￿s Shapley value is thus a weighted
average of i￿s contributions to the various possible coalitions. We assume
that the Shapley value is the payoﬀ bank i obtains from the negotiations
with the other banks at the interbank market in t =2 . For both axiomatic
and non-axiomatic justi￿cations of this assumption, the reader is referred to
the publications mentioned in the introduction, the most comprehensive of
which is Hart and Mas-Colell (1996).
8With equation 7, we get after some rearrangements
L
∗













where ρi,j = {k ∈ ρ|i,j ∈ k} and ρi as de￿ned above.
We should remain a while at equation 11. Our model predicts that trade
of liquidity at the interbank market in t =2and recourse to the central
bank￿s facilities in t =2will be such that the amount of liquidity bank i
can dispose of at the ￿rst day after the maintenance period is L∗
i,3 as given
in equation 11. Note that the liquidity bank i can dispose of at that day
originates either from required reserve holdings (Ai,2 = mi − Ai,1)o rf r o m
the usage of xi. The last line in equation 11 obviously describes the liquidity
in￿ux stemming from required reserve holdings. Thus, the ￿rst two lines give
us the liquidity originating from the usage of xi. All parts of equation 11
that drop out if rS = rD describe the impact of negotiations on L∗
i,3,s i n c e
interbank lending is useless if rS = rD.
Consider the extreme case that Ik =1for all k ∈ ρ.I t i s e a s y t o s h o w
that in this case we have
P
k∈ρi qkIk =1 . The second line in equation 11 is
obviously 0.T h u s ,t h ei n ￿ux of liquidity to bank i in t =3originating from
the usage of xi,T is xi(1 + rD). T h i si sb e c a u s eall banks have a liquidity
surplus, thus no interbank trade can take place and bank i lends its whole
surplus xi to the central bank via the deposit facility. Now ￿x some bank i
and assume that Ik =1for all k ∈ ρi and Ik =0for all k/ ∈ ρi.T h e￿rst line











k∈ρi,j qk < 1 and xj ≤ 0 for all j 6= i.T h u s , t h e i n ￿ux of
liquidity to bank i in t =3originating from the usage of xi is higher than
xi(1+rD). This proves that bank i can now lend parts of its liquidity surplus
to other banks at a rate higher than rD.
9Finally assume the other two extreme cases: If Ik =0for all k ∈ ρ (i.e.
xi < 0 for all i), banks i￿s in￿ux of liquidity stemming from the usage of xi
is xi(1 + rS), since all banks have a liquidity de￿cit, thus borrowing from
other banks is not possible and bank i borrows from the central bank only.
If Ik =0for all k ∈ ρi and Ik =1for all k/ ∈ ρi,b a n k si￿s in￿ux of liquidity
stemming from the usage of xi is higher than xi(1 + rS), since it can now
borrow parts of its liquidity de￿cit from other banks at a rate less than rS.
Equation 11 only gives us the equilibrium liquidity bank i, i =1 ,...,n,
can dispose of in t =3 . We now want to determine the underlying activities
of bank i in t =2which lead to L∗
i,3 a sd e s c r i b e di ne q u a t i o n1 1 .T od os o ,
we need to solve
L∗
i,3 = Li,3













j,2, Di ≥ 0, Si ≥ 0
i,j =1 ,...,n

         
         
(12)




i,3 for all i,j ∈ I.H e r e , L∗
i,3 is given in equation 11,
Li,3 i sg i v e ni ne q u a t i o n5a n dt h es e c o n de q u a t i o ni n1 2i sd e r i v e df r o m
equations 1, 4 and 6. Note that we do not assume r
j
i,2 = r2 for all i,j ∈ I
and some number r2. In a general equilibrium model, two diﬀerent prices
for a homogeneous good are impossible. However, our model is no general
equilibrium but a bargaining model and we show now that diﬀerent prices
for the same good are not in contradiction with our assumptions.
First note that 12 has no unique solution. Consider the following case:
n =3 , I{1} =1 , Ik =0for all k ∈ ρ\{1}. In this case of only three
banks, bank 1 has a liquidity surplus in t =2 , while the other two banks
have a liquidity de￿cit. Moreover, the liquidity de￿cit of both bank 2 and
bank 3 is higher than the liquidity surplus of bank 1.I t i s e a s y t o c h e c k









2,2 =0 , S1 = Di =0for i =1 ,2,3, S2 = −x2 − 1
2x1
and S3 = −x3 − 1
2x1. In this solution, all interbank rates are equal. But












2,2 =0 , S1 = Di =0for i =1 ,2,3,
S2 = −x2 − 1
4x1 and S3 = −x3 − 3
4x1. T h i se x a m p l es h o w st h a t( 1 )t h e r e
10is not necessarily a unique set {r
j
i,2|i,j ∈ I,i 6= j} of equilibrium interbank
rates and (2) we do not necessarily have r
j
i,2 = r2 for all i,j ∈ I and some
number r2 in equilibrium. 6
To continue, we make the following symmetry assumptions for notational
convenience: (1) sign(xi)=sign(xj) implies F
j
i,2 =0for all i,j ∈ I, i.e. two
banks do not trade with each other, if both have a liquidity de￿cit or if both
have a liquidity surplus. (2)
Pn
i=1 xi ≥ 0 and xi ≤ 0 implies Si = Di =0 .( 3 ) Pn
i=1 xi ≤ 0 and xi ≥ 0 implies Si = Di =0 .N o wd e ￿ne I+ = {i ∈ I|xi > 0},

















Note that R2 is the interbank rate index, i.e. a weighted average of all




















i,3 is uniquely given by equation 11. Thus, R2 is unique, though
r
j
i,2 for some i,j ∈ I is not. However, note that there is no trade at all if in
case (a) we have
P
i∈I− xi =0or in (b)
P
i∈I+ xi =0 .I nb o t hc a s e s ,R2 is
not de￿ned.
We now brie￿y summarize the results of our cooperative game analysis
of the interbank market at day t =2 . (1) There is not necessarily a unique
equilibrium interbank rate for the trade of liquidity among two given banks.
(2) But the equilibrium interbank rate index R2 is unique. (3) The interbank




some i,j,k,l ∈ I (i 6= j 6= k 6= l)i sp o s s i b l e .
6Note that 12 has often no solution with r
j
i,2 = r2 for all i,j ∈ I and some number r2.
If for example n =4 , Ik =1for all k ∈ {{1}, {2}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {1,2,3}, {1,2,4}}
and Ik =0otherwise, than there is no solution with an equal interbank rate for all trades.
114T h e ￿rst day of the maintenance period
We now consider day t =1and start with some introductory considerations
to obtain intuition on what is going on at the ￿rst day of the maintenance
period. With the equations 2, 3 and 6, we easily get








i,1 + gi (14)
If we assume that 0 <r
j
i,1 < 1 for all i,j ∈ I,t h e nb a n ki￿s liquidity surplus
in t =2 , i.e. xi, is decreasing in F
j
i,1 for all j ∈ I. The reason is the following:
Lending more liquidity to other banks in t =1means (1) holding less reserves
in t =1 , i.e. more remaining reserve requirements and thus a lower liquidity
surplus in t =2 , and (2) receiving more interest from other bank and thus
a higher liquidity surplus in t =2 .E ﬀect (1) is clearly stronger than eﬀect
(2). However, what is the eﬀect of F
j
i,1 on L∗
i,3? If we replace in equation 11
xi and xj for all j ∈ I\{i} by the right hand side of equation 14 and Ai,1 by






=1 − (1 − r
j








Lending to some other bank j is of course the more pro￿table for bank i,t h e
higher r
j
i,1 is. However, the sign of equation 15 is not clear. It even depends on
F
j




i,3 is piecewise linear in F
j
i,1) .B u tt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n1 5i si n
principle the higher, the higher the liquidity surplus in t =2is. For a given
r
j
i,1, equation 15 is the highest if Ik =1for all k ∈ ρi and the lowest if Ik =0
for all k ∈ ρi. There is a simple reason for this: The more some bank i lends
to other banks in t =1 ,t h el o w e ri sAi,1, the higher is its reserve requirement
in t =2and thus the lower is its liquidity surplus in t =2 . And having a low
liquidity surplus is the better the higher the liquidity surplus of the market
is.
We now consider the cooperative game played in t =1 .A si nd a yt =2 ,
all banks negotiate multilaterally with each other on interbank rates and on
12amounts of liquidity borrowed by one bank from another. To determine the
outcome of these negotiations, i.e. the Shapley value, we need to determine
the value v∗
k,1 for each possible coalition k ∈ ρ in t =1 , i.e. the characteristic
function in t =1 .A sf o rd a yt =2 , for any coalition k ∈ ρ we have F
j
i,1 =0
for all i ∈ k,j / ∈ k. Summation of the right hand side of equation 11 for
all i ∈ k after substituting Ai,1 by means of the equations 1 and 2 and after





































Note that replacing xi for all i ∈ I in equation 16 by the right hand side of
equation 14 leads us to a formula for
P
i∈k L∗
i,3 which contains only variables
chosen in t =1and variables exogenously given in t =1 .
Analogously to section 3, assume now that the members of coalition k
would act such that they maximise the sum of the (expected) payoﬀso fa l l




















i,1 = −F i
j,1 for all i,j ∈ I, F
j
i,1 =0for all i ∈ k,j / ∈ k

         
         
(17)
Note that vk,1 depends on variables that are chosen by banks which are not
members of coalition k. Thus, coalition k maximises vk,1 given the decisions
of other coalitions. But which are the other coalitions? For simplicity we
13assume that if coalition k were formed in t =1 , there would be only one
other coalition in t =1 ,n a m e l yI\k. Thus, if some coalition k were formed,
coalition I\k would also be formed and both coalitions would play a two
player Nash game in which coalition k￿s payoﬀ function is vk,1 as de￿ned in
problem 17 and its strategy set is described by the constraints presented in
problem 17. The value v∗
k,1 of coalition k is its Nash equilibrium payoﬀ in
this game.
It is important to make sure that this game has an equilibrium. Firstly,
note that F
j
i,1 = −F i






i,1 =0 , i.e. we
can simplify equation 16 accordingly. That implies that the only strategy




i,1 for all i,j ∈ k.I fw ea s s u m e
that the interest rates are restricted such that a ≤ r
j
i,1 ≤ b for some numbers
a and b and all i,j ∈ k, then the strategy set of k is compact. Secondly, it
is very easy to check that L∗
i,3 as given in equation 11 is a continuous (and
piecewise linear) function in xj for all j ∈ I.T h u s ,vk,1 is also a continuous





j ∈ I,w ek n o wt h a tc o a l i t i o nk￿s payoﬀ function vk,1 is continuous in the
strategy variables. It is well known that a game with a compact strategy set
and a continuous payoﬀ function for all players has at least one equilibrium
in mixed strategies.7 We can therefore be sure that the game described above
has at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies. However, the payoﬀ function
is not always quasi-concave so that we cannot be sure that the game has an
equilibrium in pure strategies.
For k = I, the last two lines of equation 16 are 0 and the ￿rst two lines
do not depend on strategy variables. Thus, we always have v∗














Unfortunately, for any coalition k 6= I, it is very hard to determine v∗
k,1
in general. Therefore we assume from now on that there are only n =3
banks. This is a very simply case indeed, since there is nothing a coalition
of only one bank can do so that its opponent, a coalition of two banks, has
a very simple problem to solve. Moreover, we assume that there are only
two states of the world s ∈ {s1,s 2} with probabilities p1 and p2 =1− p1.
7See for example Eichberger (1993), page 95.
14The random parameters are determined by the states according to g1(s1)=
g2(s1)=g3(s2)=g and g1(s2)=g2(s2)=g3(s1)=−g for some g>0.





i=1 xi(s2)=−g. Therefore, there is a
liquidity surplus in state s1 and a liquidity de￿cit in state s2.W i t h t h i s
example, we immediately get from equation 18
v
∗




Now assume that the coalitions {1,2} and {3} are formed. The following
lemma is proved in the appendix:
Lemma 1 In t =1 ,c o a l i t i o n{1,2} would choose (1 − r2
1,1)F 2
1,1 ≥ g (or -
because of symmetry - (1 − r2
1,1)F 2
1,1 ≤− g).
The economic reason for this result is the following: If F
j
i,1 =0for all
i,j ∈ I,b a n k3 would have a very good bargaining position in t =2 ,b e c a u s e
it would have a de￿cit if the other two banks have a surplus and a surplus if
the other two banks have a de￿cit, i.e. both bank 1 and 2 would need bank
3 in both states. If instead (1 − r2
1,1)F2
1,1 ≥ g and F
j
3,1 =0for j =1 ,2,t h e
position of bank 3 in t =2would be less strong. For in s1 both bank 1 and
3 would have a de￿cit and bank 2 a surplus, while in s2 bank 2 and 3 would
have a surplus and bank 1 ad e ￿cit.
With lemma 1 and F
j
3,1 =0for j =1 ,2, we get from 16 and 14:
v
∗
{1,2},1 =[ p1(1 + rD) − p2(1 + rS)]2g +( rS − rD)
1
2




{3},1 =[ p2(1 + rS) − p1(1 + rD)]g − (rS − rD)
1
2
g + L3 (21)
The situation occurring if the coalitions {1,3} and {2} are formed is
described by the following
Lemma 2 In t =1 ,c o a l i t i o n{1,3} would choose (1−r3
1,1)F3
1,1 = g if p1 ≥ p2
and (1 − r3
1,1)F3
1,1 = −g if p1 ≤ p2.
15This strategy would imply that x1 = x3 =0in the state with the highest
probability, i.e. neither bank 1 nor bank 3 would need to go to the facilities
in this state.8
With lemma 2 and F
j
2,1 =0for j =1 ,3 we get
v
∗
{1,3},1 = −(rS − rD)g
1
6




{2},1 =( 1 + rS)g(p1 − p2) (23)




Finally, because of symmetry we get
v
∗
{2,3},1 = −(rS − rD)g
1
6




{1},1 =( 1 + rS)g(p1 − p2) (25)




Bank i￿s Shapley value is denoted by E1[L∗∗












where qk has been de￿ned in equation 9 for all k ∈ ρ. With the characteristic
function given by the equations 19 to 25 it is quite easy to determine the




i,3]=Li +( 1+rS)g(p1 − p2) (27)











i,1 c o u l dl e a dt oas i t u a t i o nw i t hf o r
example E1[L∗
i,3] being lower than it would be if F
j
i,1 =0 . Bank i would agree on such a
deal only if i and j simultaneously agree that j pays a transfer to i in t =3to oﬀset the
losses of bank i in a coalition with j. Thus, we have to assume that banks can agree in
t =1on interbank payments in t =3 . However, in equilibrium such agreements will not
be made.
16for i =1 ,2,a n d
E1[L
∗∗








Our model implies that the in t =1expected liquidity bank i, i =1 ,2,3,c a n
dispose of in t =3is given by the equations 27 and 28. As explained, these
expectations are the result of multilateral negotiations between the three
banks in t =1and rational expectations of the outcome of the negotiations
in t =2 .
The ￿rst question we want to addressed is whether there is interbank
trade in t =1 .D e ￿ne v0
{i},1 = v{i},1 for F
j
h,1 =0for all j,h ∈ I.T h u s ,
v0
{i},1 is the in t =1expected liquidity of bank i in t =3 ,i fn ot r a d ei n
t =1takes place. It is very easy to verify that in our example above we have
v0
{i},1 <E 1[L∗∗
i,3] for i =1and i =2and v0
{3},1 >E 1[L∗∗
3,3],i f0 <p 1 < 1.T h u s ,
we can tell from the fact that v0
{i},1 and E1[L∗∗
i,3] are not equal, that trade
takes place in t =1 , i.e. F
j
i,1 6=0for some i,j ∈ I. The trade increases bank
1￿s and 2￿s expected payoﬀ, while it decreases bank 3￿s expected payoﬀ.
We now want to derive from the equations 27 and 28 the interest rates
and the credit volumes the banks have agreed on in the negotiations of day












    






i,1 and all i,j ∈ I. It is not hard to verify that 29 has no




1,1 =0 , 0 <r 3
1,1 = r3
2,1 < 1. The interbank rate index in t =1









1,1. The next proposition is the main result
of this section and follows directly from lemma 4, which we will introduced
below and prove in the appendix:
Proposition 3 For every ω ∈]0,1[, there is at least one solution of 29 with
F3




2,1 = ω, i.e. R1 = ω.
17This proposition states that there is no unique equilibrium interbank rate
index in t =1 . The equilibrium rate index can be any number between 1 and
2. There is for instance always an equilibrium with R1 = 1
2(rS+rD), i.e. with
the average equilibrium rate in t =1being exactly in the middle between
the two facility rates. This is true no matter if the market is expecting a
liquidity surplus (p1 high) or de￿cit (p1 low). And the interbank rate index
may be both low or high if there is for example an expected liquidity de￿cit.
That implies that in our model, the interbank rate index R1 does not convey
any information about the expected liquidity situation in the market.
The reason for this result is the following: When negotiating with other
banks in t =1 , each bank is only interested in maximising the expected
liquidity it can dispose of in t =3 .E a c h b a n k i s i n d i ﬀerent between two
diﬀerent constellations of interbank rates r
j
i,1 and amounts of liquidity bor-
rowed and lent F
j
i,1, i,j ∈ I, if both result in the same expected disposable
liquidity in t =3 . Proposition 3 simply states that there are many such
constellations that all lead to an expected disposable liquidity of E1[L∗∗
i,3] for
all three banks i =1 ,2,3.9
We ￿nally describe how these constellations that all solve 29 diﬀer from
each other. One might think that r3
1,1 and r3
2,1 have to rise in order to com-
pensate bank 3 if both rates are low and if F 3
1,1 and F 3
2,1 a r en e g a t i v ea n d
decreasing. And it seems plausible that for similar reasons, r3
1,1 and r3
2,1 have
to fall if they are high and F3
1,1 and F 3
2,1 are positive and increasing. I.e. we




1,1 < 0. However, the following lemma shows
that this is not necessary correct:




and 0 <r 3
1,1 = r3
2,1 < 1. Then there are numbers α, β, γ with γ < α < β
such that:
(i) For every and only for r3
1,1 ∈]0,β],t h e r ei saF 3
1,1 such that 0 >
(1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≥− g. Moreover, 0 > (1 − r3
1,1)F 3





(ii) For every and only for r3
1,1 ∈ [α,β],t h e r ei saF3
1,1 such that (1 −
r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≤− g.M o r e o v e r ,(1 − r3
1,1)F 3





9Note that it can be shown that R2 depends on R1, i.e. the alleged uniqueness of R2
holds only if R1 has been ￿xed.
18(iii) For every and only for r3
1,1 ∈ [γ,1[,t h e r ei saF 3
1,1 such that 0 <
(1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≤ g.M o r e o v e r ,0 < (1 − r3
1,1)F 3





(iv) For every and only for r3
1,1 ∈ [γ,α],t h e r ei saF 3
1,1 such that (1 −
r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≥ g. Moreover, (1 − r3
1,1)F 3





The parts (i) and (iii) of the lemma are in line with our suspicion. If
for example 0 > (1 − r3
1,1)F3
1,1 ≥− g,t h e nw eh a v eo fc o u r s eF3
1,1 < 0 (the
banks 1 and 2 are borrowing from bank 3), r3
1,1 ∈]0,β] and r3
1,1 is decreasing
in F 3
1,1. Thus, as long as r3
1,1 is relatively low (i.e. smaller than β)a n d
0 > (1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≥− g, increasing the amount the banks 1 and 2 borrow
from bank 3 and keeping the interest rate constant reduces bank 3￿s expected
pro￿t and increases the expected pro￿ts of the banks 1 and 2. To compensate
bank 3, r3
1,1 has to rise when bank 3 is lending more.
However, for any r3
1,1 ∈]α,β] there are two equilibria with F3
1,1 < 0,n a m e l y
one with 0 > (1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≥− g and one with (1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≤− g.A sj u s t
described, r3
1,1 has to rise when bank 3 is lending more and 0 > (1−r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≥
−g.B u t i f (1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≤− g, r3
1,1 has to fall when bank 3 is lending
more. Thus, if (1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≤− g, increasing the amount the banks 1 and
2 borrow from bank 3 and keeping the interest rate constant increases bank
3￿s expected pro￿t and reduces the expected pro￿ts of the banks 1 and 2.
To compensate the banks 1 and 2, r3
1,1 has to fall when bank 3 is lending
more. Thus, whether an increase in the amount borrowed by 1 and 2 has to
b ea c c o m p a n i e db yar i s eo rb yaf a l li nt h er e l a t e di n t e r e s tr a t ed o e sn o t
only depend on how high the interest rate is, but also on F 3
1,1. Note that the
reason for this result has been given in our discussion of equation 15. There,
we have seen that the impact of changes of F
j
i,1 on L∗
i,3 does not only depend
on r
j
i,1, but also on the values of the indicator functions Ik, k ∈ ρi.B e c a u s e
changing F
j
i,1 alters the position the banks i and j have in the negotiations
in t =2 .
Finally note that F3
1,1 is negative if r3
1,1 is low and F 3
1,1is positive if r3
1,1 is
high. This is plausible given that we already know that the trade in t =1
makes the banks 1 and 2 better oﬀ and bank 3 worse oﬀ.
195 Empirical results
The interbank market with the institutional characteristics described in this
paper can easily be analysed in a general equilibrium model with all banks
taking (expected) interest rates as given.10 In such a model, the interest rate
follows a martingale-like process R1 ’ E1[R2]. There is empirical evidence
that there are small deviations from the martingale hypothesis. Angelini
(2002) and Bindseil, Weller and Wuertz (2002) for example ￿nd that the
EONIA rate is on average relatively high at the end of the month. However,
all in all the martingale hypothesis seems to work quite well.
Nevertheless, in this section we try to de￿ne an alternative hypothesis
that may appear to work even better. This hypothesis is motivated by the
model of this paper. To begin with, two crucial assumptions of our model
should be noted. The ￿rst assumption is that banks do not negotiate pairwise
and successively, but multilaterally and simultaneously with each other. The
second is that those banks that negotiate with each other all have the same
information. There are hundreds of banks at for example the euro interbank
market. It is of course hard to imagine that they all negotiate simultaneously
and multilaterally and that they all have the same information. However, our
model may still appear realistic if one can show that the interbank market is
highly segmented so that there are many small groups of banks that maintain
relations almost exclusively with members of their own group. Cocco, Gomes
and Martins (2001) have shown empirically that this may indeed be the case.
Focusing on the Portuguese interbank market, they ￿nd that many banks
trade with only a few other banks over a long period.11 In the context of
these ￿ndings, our model may be interpreted as the model of one of these
segments instead of a model of the whole interbank market.
Now look at one such segment of the interbank market. If our model is
a good description of this segment, the average interest rate in this segment
at the day before the last day of the maintenance period (in our model R1)
can in principle be any number between 0 and 1. However, banks might
in reality be reluctant to agree on a zero or a one hundred percent interest
rate. It appears to be more likely that they agree on an interest rate that
is somehow ￿plausible￿ in the eyes of observers. The most plausible interest
rates on the day before the last day of a maintenance period may be the
10See for example Tapking (2002).
11Another example is Germany where a large number of small savings and of small
co-operative banks tend to trade liquidity only with their respective ￿head￿ institutions.
20expected (average) interest rate on the last day of the maintenance period
(in our model E1[R2]) and the mid point between the facility rates (in our
model 1
2(rD + rS)).
Accordingly, we now assume that there are m segments at the interbank
market. Banks in a segment negotiate and trade only with banks of the same
segment. Let Rs
t be the average interest rate at day t in segment s.I nt h e
￿rst k segments, there is a habit to set bilateral interest rates in t =1(the
day before the last day of the maintenance period) equal to 1
2(rD + rS), i.e.
Rs
1 = 1
2(rD + rS) for s =1 ,...,k. In the other segments, there is a tradition
to set interest rates according to the martingale hypothesis, i.e. Rs
1 = E1[Rs
2]
for s = k +1 ,...,m.L e tas b et h er e l a t i v ev o l u m eo fs e g m e n ts in the whole
interbank market so that
Pm

















Assuming that the expected liquidity situation is similar over all segments
(otherwise a new formation of segments takes place in the medium term),
i.e. E1[Rs














(rD + rS)+( 1− a)E1[R2] (30)
with a ≡
Pk
s=1 as > 0 . Equation 30 is the theoretical model we want to test
empirically against the martingale hypothesis a =0 .
The ￿rst problem we face is how to handle E1[R2] empirically. Two
approaches have been prevailing in the literature. The ￿rst simply replaces




(rD,p + rS,p)+( 1− a)R2,p + εp (31)
where p stands for the respective maintenance period. The other approach
replaces E1[R2] by the so called tomorrow-next futures rate F1. If two banks
agree in t =1to trade tomorrow-next at F1, they agree that the one bank
21borrows from the other banks in t =2overnight at the rate F1. That leads




(rD,p + rS,p)+( 1− a)F1,p + εp (32)
To test our theoretic model by means of the two alternative econometric
models, we use data from the European interbank market. There were 47
maintenance periods between January 1999 and December 2002. R1,p is the
EONIA rate on the day before the last day of maintenance period p, R2,p
is the EONIA rate on the last day of maintenance period p, rD,p and rS,p
are the deposit rate and the marginal lending rate on the day before the
last day of the maintenance period p and F1,p is the tomorrow-next EONIA
futures rate on the day before the last day of the maintenance period p.T h e
tomorrow-next rate is calculated as the average rate of one-day-in-advance
EONIA futures traded on the Italian e-MID platform.
Instead of estimating the restricted models of the equations 31 and 32,









(rD,p + rS,p)+c2F1,p + εp (34)
and test the hypotheses c1 + c2 =1and c1 > 0. Moreover, we estimate the
martingale models
R1,p = c2R2,p + εp (35)
and
R1,p = c2F1,p + εp (36)
and compare the goodness of ￿t of these two with the models in the equations
33 and 34. The results of the OLS estimations of the four models are given
in the following table:
22equation 33 equation 34 equation 35 equation 36
b c1 0.349 −0.163 ￿ ￿
t for H0 : c1 =0 4.065 −3.085 - -
b c2 0.653 1.156 0.999 0.996
t for H0 : c2 =0 7.634 22.129 86.008 208.42
t for H0 : c2 =1 - - −0.104 −0.909
t for H0 : c1 + c2 =1 0.198 −1.401 - -
R2 0.927 0.986 0.900 0.983
adjusted R2 0.926 0.986 0.900 0.983
Akaike info criterion 0.124 −1.521 0.394 −1.371
Schwarz criterion 0.202 −1.442 0.433 −1.332
For all hypothesis tested, the critical value on the 5% level is at about
2.016. To begin with, we see that in the models of the equations 35 and
36 the hypothesis c2 =1 , i.e. the martingale hypothesis cannot be rejected.
However, we learn from the adjusted R2, the Akaike info and the Schwarz
criterion that the model of equation 33 yields a better ￿t than the model of
equation 35 and the model of equation 34 yields a better ￿t than the model
of equation 36. We therefore concentrate on the ￿r s tt w om o d e l sg i v e ni nt h e
equations 33 and 34.12
The results for equation 33 clearly support our theoretical model of equa-
tion 30. Both hypothesis c1 =0and c2 =0can be rejected, we have b c1 > 0
and b c2 > 0 and we cannot reject the hypothesis c1 + c2 =1 .H o w e v e r ,t h e
results for equation 34 are less compelling. We still cannot reject the hypoth-
esis c1 +c2 =1 . However, we have b c1 < 0 and the hypothesis c1 =0must be
rejected.
Which of the two econometric models, equation 33 or 34, is more appropri-
ate depends on whether R2 or F1 is a better proxy for E1[R2]. Theoretically,
the rate F1 appears to be a good proxy for E1[R2] if all banks take the futures
rate as given at the futures market. However, in the light of the model of this
paper, it may be questioned that F1 ’ E1[R2] if the terms of trades at the
EONIA futures market are ￿xed in multilateral negotiations. In this case, R2
might be the better proxy for E1[R2], i.e. equation 33 is more appropriate for
12The squared correlation between 1
2(rS + rD) and R2 is 0.777.I t i s 0.874 between
1
2(rS + rD) and F1. Thus, there may be a multicollinearity problem in the regression of
the equations 33 and 34.
23the model in equation 30. Empirically, however, we have no reason to believe
that F1 is a bad proxy for E1[R2]: Estimating the mean ￿ of the expectation
error R2 − F1 leads to b ￿ = −0.0332 with a t-statistic of t = −0.765 so that
the hypothesis ￿ =0cannot be rejected.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have discussed a model of the interbank market that is based on the
assumption that banks do not take the interest rate as given, but multilater-
ally negotiate at each day of a two day maintenance period on interest rates
and on the amount of liquidity one bank borrows from another bank. The
theoretic concept we have used to model these negotiations is the Shapley
value. We have shown that the implicit average interbank rate on the ￿rst
day of the maintenance period is not unique. It is any number between 0 and
1 and therefore conveys no information on the expected liquidity situation
in the market.
One conclusion is that the market may expect a liquidity de￿cit even if
the average interbank rate is exactly in the middle between the two facility
rates. It could expect a liquidity de￿cit even if the average interbank rate
is low and it could expect a liquidity surplus even if the average rate is
high. Central bankers who believe that interbank interest rates are a matter
of multilateral negotiations would therefore need to take into consideration
additional information, for example information on transaction volumes, if
they want to assess the liquidity situation at the interbank market.
However, whether our model is a good description of the reality is hard to
say. Our empirical results crucially depend on how expectations are approx-
imated. Estimations of an econometric model that can be motivated by our
theoretical model lead to very good results if the expected interest rate on
some day t is approximated by the true interest rate of that day. However,
if we instead use forward rates to approximate expected rates, the empirical
results do not support our econometric model.
7 Appendix
Proof of the lemmas 1 and 2:
Consider two coalitions of the form {i,h} and {j}.W i t hF h








=( rS − rD)
1
6
[p1(I{i}(s1) − I{i,j}(s1) − I{h}(s1)+I{h,j}(s1))
+p2(I{i}(s2) − I{i,j}(s2) − I{h}(s2)+I{h,j}(s2))]
Note that v{h,i},1 is piecewise linear, i.e.37 is only de￿ned if
P
i∈k xi(sz) 6=0
for k ∈ {h},{h,j},{i},{i,j} and all z ∈ {1,2}. But it is a continuous
function.
Lemma 1: Let i =1 , h =2 .F o r0 < (1−r2
1,1)F2
1,1 <g ,w eh a v eI{1}(s1)=
I{2}(s1)=I{2,3}(s1)=I{2,3}(s2)=1and I{1}(s2)=I{2}(s2)=I{1,3}(s1)=
I{1,3}(s2)=0 , i.e. the right hand side of equation 37 is (rS − rD)1
6 > 0 and
v{1,2},1 is not maximised. For (1−r2
1,1)F 2
1,1 >g ,w eh a v eI{2}(s1)=I{2}(s2)=
I{2,3}(s1)=I{2,3}(s2)=1and I{1}(s1)=I{1}(s2)=I{1,3}(s1)=I{1,3}(s2)=0 ,
i.e. the right hand side of equation 37 is 0. A further increase of (1−r2
1,1)F 2
1,1
would not change v{1,2},1 anymore, thus any (1−r2
1,1)F 2
1,1 ≥ g or - because of
symmetry - (1 − r2
1,1)F 2
1,1 ≤− g maximises v{1,2},1.
Lemma 2: Let h =1and i =3 .( 1 )F o r0 < (1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 <g ,w eh a v e
I{1}(s1)=I{3}(s2)=I{1,2}(s1)=I{2,3}(s1)=I{2,3}(s2)=1and I{1}(s2)=
I{3}(s1)=I{1,2}(s2)=0 , i.e. the right hand side of equation 37 is (rS −
rD)p1
1




I{1}(s1)=I{1}(s2)=I{1,2}(s2)=0 , i.e. the right hand side of equation 37 is
−(rS − rD)p1
1
6 < 0.T h u s , (1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 = g is a local maximum. (3) For
(1 − r3
1,1)F3
1,1 > 2g,w eh a v eI{3}(s1)=I{3}(s2)=I{2,3}(s1)=I{2,3}(s2)=1
and I{1}(s1)=I{1}(s2)=I{1,2}(s2)=I{1,2}(s1)=0 , i.e. the right hand side of
equation 37 is 0. A further increase of (1−r3
1,1)F3
1,1 would not change v{1,3},1
anymore. (4) For −g<(1 − r3
1,1)F3
1,1 < 0,w eh a v eI{1}(s1)=I{3}(s2)=
I{1,2}(s1)=1and I{1}(s2)=I{3}(s1)=I{1,2}(s2)=I{2,3}(s1)=I{2,3}(s2)=0 ,
i.e. the right hand side of equation 37 is −(rS − rD)p2
1
6 > 0 and v{1,3},1
is not maximised. (5) For −2g<(1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 < −g,w eh a v eI{1}(s1)=
I{1}(s2)=I{1,2}(s1)=1and I{3}(s1)=I{3}(s2)=I{1,2}(s2)=I{2,3}(s2)=





1,1 = −g is a local maximum. (6) For (1−r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 < −2g,w e
have I{1}(s1)=I{1}(s2)=I{1,2}(s1)=I{1,2}(s2)=1and I{3}(s1)=I{3}(s2)=
I{2,3}(s2)=I{2,3}(s1)=0 , i.e. the right hand side of equation 37 is 0.A
further decrease of (1−r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 would not change v{1,3},1 anymore. It is clear
25that the local maximum (2) is higher (lower) than the local maximum (5) if
and only if p1 >p 2 (p1 <p 2).
¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3a n dl e m m a4 :











(rS − rD) 1
18g min{p1,p 2}
1 − (1 − r3
1,1)[1 + rS − (rS − rD)(1
6p1 + 1
3)]




1,1 < 0.T ob ec o n s i s t e n t ,w eh a v e
to ensure
0 ≥
(rS − rD) 1
18gmin{p1,p 2}(1 − r3
1,1)
1 − (1 − r3





















Similar considerations lead us to the following:
For −1
2g ≥ (1 − r3
1,1)F 3








1 − (1 − r3





1,1 < 0 and β
0 ≤ r3
1,1 ≤ β with
β ≡








For (1 − r3
1,1)F3








1 − (1 − r3





1,1 > 0 and α <r 3
1,1 ≤ β with
α ≡
rS − (rS − rD)1
2
1+rS − (rS − rD)1
2
For 0 ≤ (1 − r3
1,1)F 3
1,1 ≤ 1




(rS − rD)g 1
18 min{p1,p 2}
1 − (1 − r3






1,1 < 0 and r3
1,1 ≥ γ0 with
γ
0 ≡









2g ≤ (1 − r3
1,1)F 3







1 − (1 − r3






1,1 < 0 and γ0 ≥ r3
1,1 ≥ γ with
γ ≡








For (1 − r3
1,1)F3







1 − (1 − r3





1,1 > 0 and α >r 3
1,1 ≥ γ.
It is easy to show that 0 < γ < γ0 < α < β
0 < β.
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